Most people with any interest in World War II are probably familiar with the general picture. I'll just sketch it in and add some observations later.
Mussolini's Italy controlled Libya on the coast of North Africa, and the British controlled its neighbor on the east, Egypt. Possessed by Dybuk or a Djinn, Mussolini decided to invade Egypt. His forces vastly outnumbered the British but were easily beaten off. Ditto when Mussolini invaded Greece on the north shore of the Mediterranean.
Hitler, sensing his Axis comrade was having a spot of bother, postponed his invasion of Russia to send the Wehrmacht to the two hot spots.
They took Greece and forced the Brits back to north Africa. The British retreat was hasty and costly. (Viz., "The Guns of Navaron.") The German Army was commanded by Erwin Rommel, a superb tactician, and Churchill finally appointed Montgomery to head the British forces. There followed a series of back-and-forth battles ending with the withdrawal of most of the Germans from their port at Tripoli. End of north African campaign, or rather "the end of the beginning", as Churchill put it. The bells rang in steeples throughout England.
Thereafter the Allied forces took Sicily and slogged their way up the Italian boot until the end of the war put finito to their painful and costly progress.
The program is reasonably candid but omits some information that might be considered important.
Mussolini made a big mistake invading Egypt. Hitler made a big mistake in helping his buddy in the Mediterranean because it meant delaying the invasion of Russia, which in turn meant that the Germans attacks in Russia would be kneecapped by a Russian winter. The Brits made a mistake in sending troops to help Greece because it meant draining their forces in north Africa and making them more vulnerable to Rommel's incursions.
The battles themselves were the tip of the iceberg. The campaign might as well have been called the Battles of Intelligence. Each army was dependent on its supply route for essentials like water, fuel, and ammunition. Without them, no army can fight.
But the Brits (and the Poles) had broken two important Axis codes: the Germans' Enigma, which informed the Allies of Rommel's intentions, and the Italian naval code, which specified the ports and departure times of cargo ships leaving Italy to supply Rommel, exposing the ships to assaults by air and submarine. Less than half of Rommel's necessary equipment was reaching him.
By the time of the final battles, the Germas were down to 35 operating tanks and opposed by several hundred. The Germans were reduced to abandoning some operable tanks by draining their fuel in order to keep others operating.
It was an odd campaign, fought in dead earnest and with malice aforethought yet it had its politesse and sometimes its queer and ironic moments. Not in the film is an incident involving an Italian aristocrat who had been taken prisoner by the Brits. The Italian government offered a ransom for his parole. The aristocrat was so insulted by the low price of the ransom offer that he refused repatriation.
Mussolini's Italy controlled Libya on the coast of North Africa, and the British controlled its neighbor on the east, Egypt. Possessed by Dybuk or a Djinn, Mussolini decided to invade Egypt. His forces vastly outnumbered the British but were easily beaten off. Ditto when Mussolini invaded Greece on the north shore of the Mediterranean.
Hitler, sensing his Axis comrade was having a spot of bother, postponed his invasion of Russia to send the Wehrmacht to the two hot spots.
They took Greece and forced the Brits back to north Africa. The British retreat was hasty and costly. (Viz., "The Guns of Navaron.") The German Army was commanded by Erwin Rommel, a superb tactician, and Churchill finally appointed Montgomery to head the British forces. There followed a series of back-and-forth battles ending with the withdrawal of most of the Germans from their port at Tripoli. End of north African campaign, or rather "the end of the beginning", as Churchill put it. The bells rang in steeples throughout England.
Thereafter the Allied forces took Sicily and slogged their way up the Italian boot until the end of the war put finito to their painful and costly progress.
The program is reasonably candid but omits some information that might be considered important.
Mussolini made a big mistake invading Egypt. Hitler made a big mistake in helping his buddy in the Mediterranean because it meant delaying the invasion of Russia, which in turn meant that the Germans attacks in Russia would be kneecapped by a Russian winter. The Brits made a mistake in sending troops to help Greece because it meant draining their forces in north Africa and making them more vulnerable to Rommel's incursions.
The battles themselves were the tip of the iceberg. The campaign might as well have been called the Battles of Intelligence. Each army was dependent on its supply route for essentials like water, fuel, and ammunition. Without them, no army can fight.
But the Brits (and the Poles) had broken two important Axis codes: the Germans' Enigma, which informed the Allies of Rommel's intentions, and the Italian naval code, which specified the ports and departure times of cargo ships leaving Italy to supply Rommel, exposing the ships to assaults by air and submarine. Less than half of Rommel's necessary equipment was reaching him.
By the time of the final battles, the Germas were down to 35 operating tanks and opposed by several hundred. The Germans were reduced to abandoning some operable tanks by draining their fuel in order to keep others operating.
It was an odd campaign, fought in dead earnest and with malice aforethought yet it had its politesse and sometimes its queer and ironic moments. Not in the film is an incident involving an Italian aristocrat who had been taken prisoner by the Brits. The Italian government offered a ransom for his parole. The aristocrat was so insulted by the low price of the ransom offer that he refused repatriation.
