Once again, Baer becomes excited over information that he has algorithmically sucked from his immense database of declassified documents relating to the November 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy. A much-ignored report by Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Buddy Walthers yields an intriguing lead: an informant (who??) told Deputy Walthers that, prior to the assassination, Oswald made multiple visits to 3126 Harlandale Street in a near-suburban neighborhood of Dallas, Texas. Oswald's last visit was within a week before the assassination. At these meetings, a number of Cubans had gathered, representing a Venn diagram of overlapping memberships in various anti-Castro groups including one called Alpha 66. The house was nominally the residence of Jorge Salazar, and according to Baer, Salazar was a member of Alpha 66.
Walthers informed Secret Service Special-Agent-In-Charge, Forrest V. Sorrels of the information about the address where Oswald visited, and in a subsequent report, Walthers wondered whether there had been any follow up on it, especially given that his informant now told him that Salazar had abruptly moved out during the week of the assassination-at least by 23 November. (Baer and his investigative partner, Adam Bercovici, a former police lieutenant, dramatically jump to the conclusion that the Cubans moved on the 23rd, but, in fact, Walthers' report is far from that precise.)
Baer never doubts Walthers' report despite the fact that the deputy evidently never investigated the lead himself, rather taking the word of his informant, but there are several inaccuracies in the reports. For one thing, Walthers initially gets the street number wrong, although he corrects that in his subsequent report. He also misspells "Harlandale" as "Harlendale" and misreports the address as a "Street" rather than an "Avenue" (which it had been since the 1930s).
According to city directories, Jorge N. And Rosa Salazar still lived at that same address three years after the assassination. Nine years after the assassination, they resided at an address only nine minutes by car from their old Harlandale address. They did not exactly get out of town after the assassination as Baer and Bercovici are misled to think by Deputy Walthers 1963 report.
Nevertheless, Baer's hypothesis about Oswald's real plan of escape is intriguing and simple. After the assassination, Oswald first took a bus and then, when it was snarled in traffic, he took a bus transfer ticket and switched to a taxicab. From downtown Dallas, he was taken to his rooming house, but he had the presence of mind to make his driver let him out a block or so past his residence, apparently well aware of how professional covert operatives would never get out right in front of an address when they knew that someone-in this case, the police-might be lying in wait for them.
Ignoring the nosy questions of the cleaning lady, Oswald took some things-including a revolver-and hurried back onto the sidewalk. He seemed to have some purpose. Where was he planning to go?
Oswald's fate was sealed when he was stopped by a lone police officer named J. D. Tippit. Rather than submit either to questioning or arrest, Oswald shot the officer to death and took off down the street, ignoring an eyewitness several paces behind him who immediately called the police. Oswald ducked into a movie theater where he was caught within minutes.
What if Oswald had not crossed paths with Officer Tippit? If he had continued in the direction that he was walking, he would have come to a bus stop on the next block. Boarding this bus, Oswald would have been entitled to a free ride with the transfer ticket that was found in his pocket when he was arrested. Baer realizes that this bus would have taken him very near to 3126 Harlandale Ave., the very house where he was supposed to have attended a meeting a few days before. This bus route had the advantage of not being on a main drag. Law enforcement would not be swarming over this part of town yet. (After Oswald murdered Tippit, of course, they would be.)
Was that, or something like it, part of Oswald's plan? We will probably never know.
Another question that Baer wants to answer is what Cuban intelligence knew about the possibility of Oswald being supported by Cubans of any stripe. He turns to Enrique Garcia, a Cuban intelligence officer who defected to the U. S. in 1989. Garcia informs him of the biggest bombshell of all. Cuban dictator Fidel Castro had infiltrated every anti-Castro group in the United States and knew everything they were doing. He even knew that someone was going to assassinate JFK in Dallas on 22 November 1963. Of course, this bombshell is neither new nor firsthand information. The CIA found out about this at least by 1988 when another defecting intelligence officer, Florentino Aspillaga, told them. In fact, Aspillaga is the one who told Garcia about Castro's foreknowledge of the assassination.
Baer is not always original in his insights, although the few original takes on Oswald's behavior are worth noting. The times he is off the mark are too frequent. He seems to ignore glaring omissions and inaccuracies in the information he presents.
Walthers informed Secret Service Special-Agent-In-Charge, Forrest V. Sorrels of the information about the address where Oswald visited, and in a subsequent report, Walthers wondered whether there had been any follow up on it, especially given that his informant now told him that Salazar had abruptly moved out during the week of the assassination-at least by 23 November. (Baer and his investigative partner, Adam Bercovici, a former police lieutenant, dramatically jump to the conclusion that the Cubans moved on the 23rd, but, in fact, Walthers' report is far from that precise.)
Baer never doubts Walthers' report despite the fact that the deputy evidently never investigated the lead himself, rather taking the word of his informant, but there are several inaccuracies in the reports. For one thing, Walthers initially gets the street number wrong, although he corrects that in his subsequent report. He also misspells "Harlandale" as "Harlendale" and misreports the address as a "Street" rather than an "Avenue" (which it had been since the 1930s).
According to city directories, Jorge N. And Rosa Salazar still lived at that same address three years after the assassination. Nine years after the assassination, they resided at an address only nine minutes by car from their old Harlandale address. They did not exactly get out of town after the assassination as Baer and Bercovici are misled to think by Deputy Walthers 1963 report.
Nevertheless, Baer's hypothesis about Oswald's real plan of escape is intriguing and simple. After the assassination, Oswald first took a bus and then, when it was snarled in traffic, he took a bus transfer ticket and switched to a taxicab. From downtown Dallas, he was taken to his rooming house, but he had the presence of mind to make his driver let him out a block or so past his residence, apparently well aware of how professional covert operatives would never get out right in front of an address when they knew that someone-in this case, the police-might be lying in wait for them.
Ignoring the nosy questions of the cleaning lady, Oswald took some things-including a revolver-and hurried back onto the sidewalk. He seemed to have some purpose. Where was he planning to go?
Oswald's fate was sealed when he was stopped by a lone police officer named J. D. Tippit. Rather than submit either to questioning or arrest, Oswald shot the officer to death and took off down the street, ignoring an eyewitness several paces behind him who immediately called the police. Oswald ducked into a movie theater where he was caught within minutes.
What if Oswald had not crossed paths with Officer Tippit? If he had continued in the direction that he was walking, he would have come to a bus stop on the next block. Boarding this bus, Oswald would have been entitled to a free ride with the transfer ticket that was found in his pocket when he was arrested. Baer realizes that this bus would have taken him very near to 3126 Harlandale Ave., the very house where he was supposed to have attended a meeting a few days before. This bus route had the advantage of not being on a main drag. Law enforcement would not be swarming over this part of town yet. (After Oswald murdered Tippit, of course, they would be.)
Was that, or something like it, part of Oswald's plan? We will probably never know.
Another question that Baer wants to answer is what Cuban intelligence knew about the possibility of Oswald being supported by Cubans of any stripe. He turns to Enrique Garcia, a Cuban intelligence officer who defected to the U. S. in 1989. Garcia informs him of the biggest bombshell of all. Cuban dictator Fidel Castro had infiltrated every anti-Castro group in the United States and knew everything they were doing. He even knew that someone was going to assassinate JFK in Dallas on 22 November 1963. Of course, this bombshell is neither new nor firsthand information. The CIA found out about this at least by 1988 when another defecting intelligence officer, Florentino Aspillaga, told them. In fact, Aspillaga is the one who told Garcia about Castro's foreknowledge of the assassination.
Baer is not always original in his insights, although the few original takes on Oswald's behavior are worth noting. The times he is off the mark are too frequent. He seems to ignore glaring omissions and inaccuracies in the information he presents.