"Former" CIA officer Bob Baer and his associate, former Los Angeles Police Lieutenant Adam Bercovici, debunk their own theory that Lee Harvey Oswald's meetings with the Soviets and Cubans in the early fall of 1963 might have led to him winning their support for an assassination plot.
Oswald was in Mexico City from 27 September to 2 October 1963. He may have visited the Soviet embassy on the 28th as Baer suggests but, according to other sources, perhaps it was the 27th. (Baer does not make it clear whether the visits to the two embassies were on the same day, but other sources indicate that they were.)
After talking to "former" KGB officer Oleg Nechiporenko, Baer changes his mind about his hypothesis that the Soviets might have agreed to work with Oswald. Nechiporenko, a smooth-talking old man who must have been almost as smooth when he was a young KGB agent in the 1960s, tells Baer that Oswald made a scene at the Soviet embassy in Mexico City, even brandishing a revolver at one point. His gun was taken from him, and he was ejected from the building. The old KGB officer says that Oswald seemed emotionally volatile and psychologically unstable. Baer suggests that Oswald was a time bomb. "A tornado," Nechiporenko corrects him. "Someone makes a time bomb; a tornado forms on its own." (Curiously, Baer goes back to Bercovici and tells him that Nechiporenko said that Oswald was "a ticking time bomb".) Baer is now convinced that Nechiporenko has told the truth and that the Soviets were not interested in using Oswald in any way. Why does he believe the old KGB man, especially when Baer should know that there are many ways-within limits-to use even an unreliable person?
Next, Baer looks at Oswald's contact with the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. (Oswald applied for a transit visa to Russia via Cuba, but Baer doesn't mention Russia in this Cuban context.) Oswald was first turned away, according to Baer, because he did not have the requisite photographs. (Actually, Oswald did come back later with photographs; the real problem was that in order to get a transit visa to Russia via Cuba, he had to get a visa from the Soviets first, and he had not done so.)
Baer decides that it would be crucial to talk to Silvia Duran who worked for the Cuban consul at that time, and he tracks her down. (Baer must know that her name is no longer Duran, but he keeps referring to her by her old name even while trying to address her through her locked front door.) She said in two prior statements-one in the 1960s and another in the late 1970s-that she tried to help Oswald with his visa application, even though he was very disagreeable, and that her only contact with him was during his three brief visits to her office regarding his application. According to Duran's testimony, Oswald made a scene when he could not get his application for a visa expedited. He then argued heatedly with the consul, Duran's superior, and was escorted from the building-just as he had been kicked out of the Soviet embassy earlier the same day. Baer attempts to interview Duran, and at one point she promises to meet with him but stands him up, instead.
Baer ignores the point that the only reason that Oswald ever gave for wanting to go to Cuba was to stop there while on his proposed journey to Russia. No evidence is given to show that Oswald came to Mexico with a ready plan to kill the American president or that this idea was suggested to him by someone in Mexico. There is evidence of contact with communist governments, but beyond that Baer has only inference and speculation, so far. The facts are good to know as are the possibilities, but they do not prove anything conclusively. Besides, Baer seems ready to abandon one hypothesis for the next, which is that Oswald's contacts with Cubans prior to his trip to Mexico is crucial in understanding where he found support for his mission to assassinate the president of the United States.
Oswald was in Mexico City from 27 September to 2 October 1963. He may have visited the Soviet embassy on the 28th as Baer suggests but, according to other sources, perhaps it was the 27th. (Baer does not make it clear whether the visits to the two embassies were on the same day, but other sources indicate that they were.)
After talking to "former" KGB officer Oleg Nechiporenko, Baer changes his mind about his hypothesis that the Soviets might have agreed to work with Oswald. Nechiporenko, a smooth-talking old man who must have been almost as smooth when he was a young KGB agent in the 1960s, tells Baer that Oswald made a scene at the Soviet embassy in Mexico City, even brandishing a revolver at one point. His gun was taken from him, and he was ejected from the building. The old KGB officer says that Oswald seemed emotionally volatile and psychologically unstable. Baer suggests that Oswald was a time bomb. "A tornado," Nechiporenko corrects him. "Someone makes a time bomb; a tornado forms on its own." (Curiously, Baer goes back to Bercovici and tells him that Nechiporenko said that Oswald was "a ticking time bomb".) Baer is now convinced that Nechiporenko has told the truth and that the Soviets were not interested in using Oswald in any way. Why does he believe the old KGB man, especially when Baer should know that there are many ways-within limits-to use even an unreliable person?
Next, Baer looks at Oswald's contact with the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. (Oswald applied for a transit visa to Russia via Cuba, but Baer doesn't mention Russia in this Cuban context.) Oswald was first turned away, according to Baer, because he did not have the requisite photographs. (Actually, Oswald did come back later with photographs; the real problem was that in order to get a transit visa to Russia via Cuba, he had to get a visa from the Soviets first, and he had not done so.)
Baer decides that it would be crucial to talk to Silvia Duran who worked for the Cuban consul at that time, and he tracks her down. (Baer must know that her name is no longer Duran, but he keeps referring to her by her old name even while trying to address her through her locked front door.) She said in two prior statements-one in the 1960s and another in the late 1970s-that she tried to help Oswald with his visa application, even though he was very disagreeable, and that her only contact with him was during his three brief visits to her office regarding his application. According to Duran's testimony, Oswald made a scene when he could not get his application for a visa expedited. He then argued heatedly with the consul, Duran's superior, and was escorted from the building-just as he had been kicked out of the Soviet embassy earlier the same day. Baer attempts to interview Duran, and at one point she promises to meet with him but stands him up, instead.
Baer ignores the point that the only reason that Oswald ever gave for wanting to go to Cuba was to stop there while on his proposed journey to Russia. No evidence is given to show that Oswald came to Mexico with a ready plan to kill the American president or that this idea was suggested to him by someone in Mexico. There is evidence of contact with communist governments, but beyond that Baer has only inference and speculation, so far. The facts are good to know as are the possibilities, but they do not prove anything conclusively. Besides, Baer seems ready to abandon one hypothesis for the next, which is that Oswald's contacts with Cubans prior to his trip to Mexico is crucial in understanding where he found support for his mission to assassinate the president of the United States.